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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, the price of credit protection in the Euro area has
substantially increased as systemic risks have grown more prominent. In late September 2008, the
sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market attracted considerable attention, which peaked in flight
to safety episodes in May 2010 (Beber et al., 2008). Sovereign debt markets in several countries
came under stress, and massive sell-offs in government bonds were observed. High CDS quotes dur-
ing that period were interpreted as falling market liquidity and also as concerns about an increasing
number of credit rating downgrades. In other words, since the sovereign Euro crisis, CDS spreads
have been considered as warning signaling tools that may increase the perception of government
credit riskiness and, consequently, the systemic risk.
In this context, the concept of systemic risk refers to the possibility that a collapse of one of the
components of a complex system leads to the instability or breakdown of the entire system. Finan-
cial systems are often highly interconnected, and such interconnections contribute to risk spreading.
The possibility of cascading failures, that is the default of one financial agent might trigger defaults
of others, makes systemic risk extremely dangerous for the whole system.
Several scholars pointed attention to the connection between CDS spreads and systemic risk. For
instance, Ang and Longstaff (2013) studied the systemic risk component in sovereign credit spreads
by comparing the CDSs issued in the USA and those issued within the Eurozone. They found that
the systemic component was larger among Eurozone sovereigns and mainly determined by global
financial variables. Caceres et al. (2010) assessed that the relative weight of global risk aversion and
of country-specific risks changes with time. The persistence of local or global factors mainly depends
on the state of the economy. Augustin and Tédongap (2016) confirmed the existence of time-varying
risk premia in sovereign spreads as compensation for exposure to US macroeconomic risk. Capponi
et al. (2020) dealt with sovereign risk debt in the context of network. In particular, the authors
investigated how the interbank network structure and the distribution of sovereign debt holdings
jointly affect the optimal bailout policy. The authors showed that the “too interconnected to fail”
problem is exacerbated by the fact that banks are exposed to their sovereign’s default risk because of
a large amount of domestic public debt in their portfolio and, at the same time, governments resort
to public bailouts when their domestic banking sector is in trouble. In this paper we deal with an
optimization problem where the decision maker aims at minimizing the systemic sovereign risk of a
set of interconnected countries. To this aim, the economic agent optimally selects his country-based
exposure to sovereign and systemic risks.
We define systemic risk in the context of a global network where nodes are countries and weights of
edges reflect the intensity of their relations. We measure such intensities by means of CDS-implied
sovereign default probabilities and assume that the systemic effect can be represented through a
suitable function of these probabilities.
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Since interconnections are strictly related to the network structure (see, e.g., Sun and Chan-Lau
(2017); Krichene et al. (2017)), we model them by using the weighted clustering coefficient (Onnela
et al. (2005)), which represents a network indicator measuring the level of cliquishness of the neigh-
bouring of the nodes. This network indicator has been used in the literature to identify different
over time levels of systemic risk in the market (see e.g. Minoiu and Reyes (2013), Tabak et al.
(2014), and Bongini et al. (2018)). Indeed, any non-isolated node i is connected with other nodes
of the network. In turn, such nodes are connected with each other, so that there is the possibility
of having one or more triangles around i. Nodes adjacent to i become more interconnected as the
number of existing triangles approaches the number of the potential ones. Therefore, the clustering
coefficient of the network we used here is interpreted as a proxy of the systemic risk of the network
itself.
The employed optimization criterion is based on the minimization of a suitably considered risk
measure, the mean absolute deviation (MAD) (see Konno and Yamazaki (1991) and Zenios and
Kang (1993)). The MAD metric makes the problem tractable and provides interpretable insights
as it can be formalized as a linear programming one. Moreover, due to its generality, it does
not require any specific distributional assumption. The useful properties of MAD let such a risk
measure be particularly suitable for portfolio models and their applications (see e.g. Konno and
Wijayanayake (2002); Yu and Wang (2012)). Since our proposal deals with clustering coefficients
and systemic risk, it is structurally different from the classical financial allocation models and cannot
be compared taking classical models as benchmarks (as in Ban et al. (2016) and DeMiguel et al.
(2009)).
Concerning the use of optimization techniques for systemic risk minimization, our approach is in
line with the widely-cited European Central Bank (ECB) research paper by Holló et al. (2012). The
authors propose a new measure of systemic risk in the financial system, named Composite Indicator
of Systemic Stress (CISS ). Such a measure is methodologically grounded on portfolio theory and
it is formally given by the aggregation of five categories of stress measures related to five specific
sectors as a weighted combination. Weights are portfolio quotes, and the higher their values, the
more relevant is the stress of the related market segment. Weights are fixed a priori on the basis
of the characteristics of stress measures and their connections, and they are periodically calibrated
by ECB. Thus, CISS represents a systemic risk measure based on the preliminary statement of the
relative relevance of the sectors associated with the stress measures. The popularity of CISS as a
systemic risk measure has been certified by the literature which has proposed application of CISS
to several contexts (see, e.g., Louzis and Vouldis (2012), Dovern and Van Roye (2014), MacDonald
et al. (2015), Duprey et al. (2017), Garcia-de Andoain and Kremer (2017)).
In our study, we detect the relevance of each country through a portfolio-type optimization
procedure, so that portfolio weights are not fixed a priori but derived through an optimization
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model. Portfolio quotes describe the relative relevance of the countries as systemically risky agents
within the overall system. In accord with CISS, the relative importance of the country as systemically
risky element in the overall system grows as the portfolio weight associated with a given country
increases. In particular, a high value of the weight means that the related country plays a relevant
role in reducing (i.e., minimizing) systemic risk. We then contribute to the literature providing a
systemic risk measure of a system of countries and identifying the systemically relevant countries
among the considered ones.
An empirical analysis has been developed to validate the model. The systemic risk of a set of
13 European countries is considered on the basis of the forward-looking information implied in the
sovereign CDS spreads, which are available on a daily basis. The analysis is time dependent, and a
time period ranging from June 2003 to June 2017 is considered. From sovereign CDS quotes, we can
derive the probability of default of each country. Two different strategies are taken into account:
long-term and short-term frameworks. These two settings lead to different optimal solutions. The
long-term framework provides insights into the evolution properties of such a risk, while the short-
term framework is more effective in understanding the point-wise values. In general, results reflect
the financial and economic reality of the European countries in times of crisis, highlighting also the
disparities among members of the European Union. In particular, the obtained results show that
clustering coefficients emphasize the main facts that characterize the European sovereign debt crisis
and the already mentioned flight to safety episodes. The clustering coefficient can be viewed as a new
indicator to assess the evolution of the sovereign systemic risk in a geographical area. Specifically,
an increase of the clustering coefficient can reflect market participants’ perception of high failure
risk as well as their view that the probability of common failings is large. In addition, the weighted
clustering coefficient reflects the various degrees of importance of different countries in contributing
to the sovereign systemic risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to formalization of the network
framework we are embedded in. Section 3 contains the formal definition of the systemic risk concept
in the portfolio context we are dealing with. Section 4 introduces the minimum systemic risk
portfolio model, with its related considered measures. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical
experiments that validate the theoretical results. Furthermore, in Section 5.1 we report several
sensitivities over the range of credible model parameters as well as a comparison with the use of a
Value at Risk (VaR) risk measure. Section 6 provides conclusions.
4
2 The network
The system is described through a network1 where N nodes represent countries, collected in a set
V = {1, . . . , N}, and each pair of nodes i and j is connected by a link (i, j). The effect of one country’s
influence on another is measured by suitable weights that are built – as we will see below – according
to the default probabilities of the neighbourhood countries, which are inferred from sovereign CDSs,
hence mirroring their respective levels of sovereign risk. In the empirical experiments, we consider
a set of N = 13 European countries.
To construct the weighted adjacency matrix of the network, we move from the evidence that the
sovereign risk of a country in V varies with time and it is implied in its sovereign CDS spreads.
Specifically, suppose that T -joint realizations of CDS quotes are available for N countries. For
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and i ∈ V , we denote the CDS spread of country i at time t as si(t). The implied
probability of default Pi(t) of country i at time t is obtained by CDS spread, si(t), and the recovery
rate in case of default, Rec, by using the following formula (see e.g. Hull and White (2000) Dı́az
et al. (2013); Das and Hanouna (2009)):






As we will see, we set Rec = 0.40 in the empirical analysis. Such a setting is consistent with a wide
set of authoritative reference studies (see e.g. Hull and White (2004); Dı́az et al. (2013) and the
monograph of Hull (2003)).
One can reasonably argue that the network model might also be developed by using CDS spreads
directly. However, there are two reasons for preferring default probabilities to credit spreads. First,
the events under investigation are the possible defaults of the considered countries. In this respect,
it is worth pointing out that CDS spreads allow insights to be gained on the creditworthiness of the
countries in terms of their default probabilities. Thus, we have provided a more intuitive analysis
of default probabilities rather than the less intuitive one of CDS spreads. Second, dealing with
probabilities allow formalization of the stochastic dependence structure among the countries.
We assume that the mutual influence of the sovereign risks of countries i and j at time t is measured
through the product of default probabilities of both countries, so that we define:
wij(t) = Pi(t)Pj(t), ∀ i 6= j. (1)
The rationale behind (1) is that the mutual influence between couples of countries grows with
their default probabilities. Taking the weights as in (1) means that the defaults of the countries
1We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of graph theory (Harary, 1969) and complex
networks (see Newman (2010), Estrada (2012))
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are independent events. As explained below, such assumption is reasonable. A stylized fact in
finance and economics is that countries and markets are more positively correlated in situations
of financial distress and negative business cycles. Thus, even if we do not have a detailed idea
about the correlation between possible default events, we expect a positive one. In this case, if a
country is experiencing financial distress, then other countries of the system should also be involved
in such a negative economic outlook. When setting independence, we remove such an amplification
effect. Thus, our results tend to isolate the most relevant countries in the context of systemic risk
without taking into account side effects due to positive correlations. Significantly, the independence
assumption provides an underestimation of the risk. Hence, if a country is relevant for systemic risk
under independence, then it would be really taken into consideration and has to be at the core of
further analysis and policy implementation.
However, we have also tested the effects of the removal of the independence assumption (see Section
5.1.1 for details), to provide a wider view of the systemic risk problem.
By construction, the connection between the risk profiles of countries i and j at time t increases as
the value of wij(t) grows. Since wij(t) ∈ [0, 1], the maximum level of interaction between i and j –
in terms of riskiness – is achieved when Pi(t) = Pj(t) = 1. Moreover, a country with null default
probability (then with wij(t) = 0) does not influence and is not affected by other countries in the
system. As we will see, the case of null weights does not appear in our empirical analysis, since all the
considered networks are complete. The N -square symmetric matrix at time t is W(t) = [wij(t)]i,j∈V ,
representing the adjacency relations of the network and the weights associated with edges at time
t. As the network G is complete, all nodes have the same degree, N − 1.
informative measure, capturing most of the interconnections.
3 Definition of systemic risk
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the portfolio-based systemic risk measure considered in
this paper is conceptualized on the scientific basis of CISS (Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress),
introduced by Holló et al. (2012). This indicator is obtained by combining different subindices cor-
responding to specific sectors in a “portfolio” that well capture different aspects of financial distress.
Formally, the CISS at time t is computed as product between the weighted vector of subindices
and the matrix of time-varying cross-correlation coefficients at time t. In Holló et al. (2012), the
portfolio shares (the subindices’ weights) are not the result of an optimization procedure, but are
determined “a priori”, on the basis of its relative importance for real economic activity. The indica-
tor then accounts for several factors, as financial distress is reflected on the real economy. Inspired
by the idea of CISS, in our setting portfolio weights describe the relative relevance of the countries
as systemically risky agents within the overall system. We refer in our approach to a single indicator
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– the clustering coefficient – including all countries with different weights. Unlike CISS, weights
in our model are obtained by solving an optimization problem that takes into account the role of
the countries to reduce the risk. In particular, portfolio quotes are dimensionless quantities and
provide the scores of countries in the context of systemic risk. In this, we are in agreement with the
theoretical conceptualization of CISS, where the shares of the portfolio measure countries’ relevance
for real economies. We can derive the relative systemic importance of a country by means of CISS,
so that our approach can be efficiently compared with that in Holló et al. (2012) (see also Subsection
5.1.4). In accord with CISS, the relative systemic importance of the country in the overall system
grows as its portfolio weight increases. More specifically, a high value of the weight means that the
country plays a relevant role in reducing (i.e., minimizing) systemic risk.
Despite this similarity, we depart from CISS in a relevant respect. The weights of CISS are fixed
a priori on the basis of the characteristics of stress measures and their connections. Hence, CISS
represents a systemic risk measure based on a preliminary statement of the relative relevance of the
involved economic sectors. In our study, we detect the relevance of each country through a portfolio
optimization procedure. In this respect, portfolio quotes are not fixed a priori, but they are derived
through an optimization model.
A very important aspect of both CISS, and our systemic risk model, is the way in which nodes are
connected. CISS includes in its formulation the correlation coefficients between couples of stress
measures. As explained in Section 2, in our setting two different countries are strongly connected
when they have, on average, a high level of default probability. Thus, as in the context of CISS, we
create a network model where high connections are represented by a common behavior. According
to the standard conceptualization, in our model, we view the systemic risk under two different per-
spectives: on the one hand, it is associated with the instability of the system in the presence of a
(negative) exogenous shock; on the other hand, it is assumed to be high in the presence of highly
interconnected systems. Specifically, our proposal is to measure systemic risk by using a combina-
tion of the fluctuations of the community structure of the system along with the strength of the
community structure itself. Indeed, high fluctuations are associated with high instability and uncer-
tainty, and hence with high systemic risk; moreover, a high level of community structure fosters the
propagations of shocks. The idea is that the occurrence of a negative shock generates an increase in
the default probability of one or more countries, which in turn provides stronger connections among
some nodes. If the level of the community structure of the network tends to be stable over time,
the shock is expected to be efficiently absorbed. Differently, a highly volatile community structure
would lead to a strong aggregated fluctuation of the system in the presence of microscopic shocks,
and thus to a high level of systemic risk. Shock spreading is, of course, also dependent from the
interconnectivity of the network.
In the context of the community structure of a complex network, the clustering coefficient is ac-
7
knowledged in the literature to be particularly suitable for providing a measure of the strength of
the communities (see e.g. Radicchi et al. (2004) and Clauset (2005) and reference therein). It is
worth stressing once again that the concept of systemic risk is related to the interconnection of
the system. In turn, interconnection refers to clusters of nodes or, in other words, to communities.
Therefore, we need a measure that is meaningful in expressing this specific aspect.










(N − 1)(N − 2)
, (2)
where t = 1, . . . , T and i ∈ V . Notice that C̃i(t) has been constructed by extending to a multi-period
setting the coefficient2 proposed by Onnela et al. (2003) and Onnela et al. (2005). In particular, as
wij(t) ∈ [0, 1], no further normalization is required.
It is worth noting that interconnections can also be represented by cycles of length n > 3, and
not by triangles. In this perspective, the literature presents some centrality measures referring to n
cycles (see e.g. Estrada and Rodŕıguez-Velázquez (2005)). However, the length of the cycle affects
the node itself, because the longer the cycle, the less the influence of the cycle on the node. As
the network is complete, nodes are strongly interconnected and the clustering coefficient is the most
informative measure, capturing most of the interconnections.3
Under a purely financial perspective, one can argue that CDS volatility or CDS correlation can
be used in our specific context to detect the patterns of the sovereign default probabilities. However,
such measures present a limit. The CDS volatility does not take into account the interconnections
among the countries, so that the role of their mutual influence appears to be lost. The CDS
correlation provides restrictive analysis of the mutual influence between couples of countries, without
taking into account their interactions with the surrounding countries and the possible presence of
a noticeable community structure. The introduction of the clustering coefficient overcomes such
limitations.
We denote as Ci the vector of the clustering coefficients C̃i’s computed over time t = 1, . . . , T , so
that:
Ci = (C̃i(1), . . . , C̃i(T )), i ∈ V. (3)
At time t, we define a portfolio by x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t)) such that xk(t) ≥ 0, for each k =
1, . . . , N , and
∑N
i=1 xi(t) = 1. As we will see in detail in the next section, xk(t) represents the
2See also Clemente and Grassi (2018) and Fagiolo (2007) for extensions in case of weighted and directed graphs.
3The choice of other (alternative) measures is possible but each centrality measure describes only one specific
network characteristic, such as capturing the relevance of a node taking into account the relevance of the neighbours.
Thus, other measures seem less effective than the clustering coefficient to the measurement of systemic risk in a
undirected and dense graph.
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relative relevance of country k as systemic risk minimizer at time t. This explains why it is taken
to be non-negative and belonging to a set of normalized quantities.
We now introduce the key quantitative tool of the proposed systemic risk model. Given t > 0





The quantity C̃(t) clearly depends on x(t). However, the explicit reference to portfolio x(t) in
denoting C̃(t) is omitted in formula (4).
We introduce the notation C̃ = (C̃(1), . . . , C̃(T )) and x = (x(1), . . . ,x(T )).
Following the arguments developed above, systemic risk is associated with a given portfolio x; it
is minimized under a bicriteria objective related to the average of the oscillations of C̃ around its
mean and also the mean of the clustering coefficient.
Therefore, we view Ci as a statistical variable whose realizations are the clustering coefficients of
node i at times t = 1, . . . , T , which are presented in formula (3) in a vectorial form in order to
convey the presence of a time order in the realizations . We define the mean of C̃ with entries as in



























We are now ready to provide the definition of systemic risk of a portfolio through a preference
criterion.
Definition 1. Consider two portfolios xA = (xA(1), . . . ,xA(T )) and xB = (xB(1), . . . ,xB(T )),
and denote the related vectors of clustering coefficients whose entries are as in (4) by C̃A and C̃B,
respectively.
We say that the systemic risk of xA is higher than that of xB when E[C̃A] ≥ E[C̃B ]V[C̃A] ≥ V[C̃B ], (7)
with at least one strict inequality.
Definition 1 provides the basis of the optimization problems, which will be developed in the next
section.
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4 Sovereign systemic risk-minimization problems
In this section we move from the arguments developed in the previous section and from Definition
1, and conceptualize the systemic risk-minimization problems.
In particular, following Definition 1, we consider an agent whose aim is to select the portfolio x for
minimizing the MAD of the related clustering coefficient C̃ under the constraint that the value E[C̃]
in (5) is below a fixed threshold µ̄. Therefore, the risk-minimization problem we deal with can be
formalized through a reinterpretation of a classical portfolio model. The general form of the optimal

























i=1 xi(t)C̃i(t) ≤ µ̄∑N
i=1 xi(t) = 1, for each t = 1, . . . , T ;
xi(t) ≥ 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T .
(9)
where µ̄ represents the highest level of expected clustering coefficient that can be tolerated by the
minimizing agent. We denote the optimal portfolio as (x?(1), . . . ,x?(T )).
We remark here that the weights of the optimal portfolio describe the relative relevance of the
considered countries as systemically risky agents within the overall system. In particular, each
weight x?k represents the relative importance of country k in the context of minimization of the risk
of the overall system, so that the contribution of country k to the reduction of the systemic risk of
the overall system grows with x?k. Such an interpretation of the x
? values and assessment of the
ones minimizing the systemic risk lead to noticeable insights for regulators, central banks and also
retail investors. In particular, the identification of the most systematically relevant countries might
drive regulators and central banks to implement policies targeted on the features of the economic
system of specific countries, and investors to take positions in the financial markets, in the light of
fostering the stability of the overall system.
Moreover, we move from Definition 1, where we have presented a portfolio-based concept of systemic
risk through a bicriteria preference rule. Such an approach is totally in line with the constrained
optimization problem in (8)-(9). In this respect, it is interesting to note the similarity of our
framework with the classical mean-variance portfolio model. Also in our case, we have an apparent
trade-off between MAD and expectation of the clustering coefficient, with the remarkable difference
that both of them have to be minimized.




































i=1 xi(t)C̃i(t) ≤ µ̄;∑N
i=1 xi(t) = 1, for each t = 1, . . . , T ;
xi(t) ≥ 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T .
(11)
For a general discussion of the linearization error, we refer to Bushnell and Baumol (1967),
where authors provide an extensive and formal discussion of the error due to the linearization of a
nonlinear problem. In a very general sense, the quoted paper leads to two main outcomes. On the
one hand, the error is strongly dependent on the specific linearized optimization problem, and no
consensus can be achieved on a purely theoretical way – i.e., without considering the characteristics
of the considered problem – to describe it. Indeed, the error derives from a numerical study of
the peculiar linearized nonlinear problem. On the other hand, a proper estimation of the error
can be achieved only by comparing the solution of the linear optimization problem and that of the
associated nonlinear one. In particular, authors test four measures for evaluating the error over a
suitably built numerical experiments. Evidently, the numerical experiments provided in Bushnell
and Baumol (1967) are properly conceptualized, so that the real solution of the nonlinear problem
can be easily computed.
In our case, the analysis of the error can be done only by computing the real solutions of our
nonlinear MAD optimal portfolio models and comparing them with the solutions of the linear prob-
lems through some of the measures proposed by Bushnell and Baumol (1967). Such a computational
effort is here unnecessary, since MAD is a classical device for making optimal allocation, and its
linearization is a well-established technique. For the specific case of the MAD optimal portfolio
problem, Konno and Yamazaki (1991) and many followers have already shown that the solution of
the linearized model represents a reliable approximation of its nonlinear version. In so doing, such
a strand of literature points to an acceptable linearization error in the case of MAD and uses the
linearized version of the MAD as an opportunity to be exploited in this types of portfolio models.
Two subproblems of the general setting (8)-(9) are considered here. The first one deals with a
multi-period optimization such that portfolios are recombined on a time-period basis; the second
one is the one-period case. The former setting considers an economic agent making decisions on
short-term horizons, on the basis of periodic observations and updated conditions of the problem.
The latter case is associated with a long-term perspective, characterized by an overall analysis of
the phenomenon and a definitive decision in terms of portfolio quotes, which remain fixed for the
entire time period under consideration.
Short- and long-term frameworks provide very different views on the considered systemic risk
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problem, and both of them have to be taken into full consideration in a unified setting to obtain a
panoramic perspective of the treated theme.
In this respect, it is worth emphasizing here that the results of a risk-minimization procedure are
sensitive to the considered time horizon, and one cannot guess a priori what will be the most fruitful
procedure at a common future terminal date.
By definition, the short-term setting allows identification of the trajectory of the risk-minimizer
portfolio in stepwise form. Such an approach is associated with close control of the changing condi-
tions of the problem; nevertheless, it might present drawbacks connected to the possibility that the
optimal steps may lead to subsequent negative evolutions of risk levels.
In the context of long-term setting, changing conditions cannot be taken into account over the time
period. The selection of the entire trajectory of the optimizing portfolio is performed on the basis of
a forecast procedure implemented at the initial time. This is undoubtedly a limit of the long-term
approach, which, however, is not affected by the drawbacks characterizing the short-term setting.
In the following, we study both frameworks, compare them and draw insights from them.
4.1 Short-term multi-period setting
Consider an increasing sequence of times (T0, T1, . . . , TK) such that 0 = T0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < TK =
T . For each k = 1, . . . ,K, we deal with an optimal portfolio problem in the sub-periods defined by
the sequence (Tk−1 + 1, Tk−1 + 2, . . . , Tk−1 + `), with Tk−1 + ` = Tk. We denote a generic portfolio
in the sub-period ranging from Tk−1 + 1 to Tk as x





































i ≥ 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N .
(13)
The resulting optimal portfolio is x(k)?. Then, we have a time-varying optimal portfolio x?S =
(x(1)?, . . . ,x(K)?).
4.2 Long-term time-independent setting
Here we consider x(t) = x, for each t = 1, . . . , T , so that the admissible portfolios are assumed to


























i=1 xiC̃i(t) ≤ µ̄,∑N
i=1 xi = 1,
xi ≥ 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N .
(15)
The resulting optimal portfolio is x?L.
5 Empirical analysis
In this paper, the empirical analyses are based on five-year sovereign CDS daily quotes in basis
points, denominated in US dollars and provided by the Bloomberg platform (standard ISDA 2014).
The time period under investigation is 2 April 2003 to 3 July 2017, which includes the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brother and the sovereign debt crisis of developed countries, which are associated with
increasing levels of signed sovereign CDS contracts. A five-year CDS was decided upon, as it is
commonly considered to be the reference and most liquid one. In particular, the data set is composed
of 13 European countries inside and outside the European Union and European Monetary Union.
Countries are distributed in four main groups: a) the core economies France, Germany and the
United Kingdom; b) the most worrying economies – Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; c) the Eastern
economies – Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Turkey; and d) Greece. The first group
contains countries with a credit rating of at least A, while the second group is composed of some CDS
entities rated worse than A. The third considers a specific geographical area, Eastern economies and
Turkey, while the fourth only Greece, which was the first European country that experienced in 2012
a partial default after the constituency of the currency union. The resulting time series considers
3,514 days, which result in a total of 40,898 spread observations.4 The sovereign CDS spreads are
considered instruments implicitly reflecting the default probabilities of the considered set of countries.
The evolution of the probability of default for each country over time is reported in Figure 1, where
some missing values are shown, especially for Greece (but also Ireland, United Kingdom and Czech
Republic), as, mainly due to the sovereign debt crisis, the corresponding sovereign CDSs were not
traded during the whole period covered by the data set.
As described in Section 2, probabilities of default are used to build a complete weighted network
for each time period and to compute local clustering coefficients via formulas (1) and (2). By
looking at the clustering coefficients in Figure 1 (right), we observe that several spikes mark some
of the key developments in the European sovereign debt crisis. In particular, the period 2003-2008
is characterized by low values of coefficients, while from the beginning of 2009 coefficients rapidly
increase reaching, at the end of 2011, values that are 30 times or more larger than they were before.
This increase is more noticeable for some specific countries. For instance, creditor’s expectations
4The number of observations has been computed excluding missing values.
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about the ability of the Greek Government to honour its contractual obligations radically changed
after 2009, and, therefore, credit spreads rose steeply. This effect is strongly reflected on the local
clustering coefficient of this node, which increased by about 500 times from the beginning of 2008.
The dramatic rise of sovereign debt spreads for peripheral European countries (see Santis (2012))
is also captured. Marked increases (more than 100 times) of clustering coefficients are observed in
decreasing order also for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and France.
Figure 1: Probabilities of default Pi(t) and local clustering coefficients evaluated using weights
calibrated via formula (1) on CDS quotes. To improve the readability of the plot, the y-axis has
been limited at 0.4 on the left-hand side plot. However, the probability of default of Greece reached
higher levels between September 2011 and September 2013 with peaks greater than 0.5.
This empirical evidence is shown in Figure 1 and confirms that the clustering coefficient can
be seen as a systemic risk measure, capturing the intensity of interactions among countries. Such
evidence represents a supporting argument of its suitability for defining an effective systemic risk
measure, as already stressed in Section 4.
A multi-period optimization, with recombined portfolios at each iteration, was initially applied to
the networks. In particular, the problem (12-13) has been solved after applying the linearization
described in Section 4. We initially focused on sub-periods of 30 days. In this case, the economic
agent selects an optimal portfolio in each sub-period on the basis of periodic observation and updated
conditions. We report in Figure 2 the obtained optimal x∗S .
We observe that in periods characterized by low values of local clustering and volatility, the optimal
solution is well diversified (see e.g. 2003-2007). In other words, several countries contribute to
minimizing the systemic risk in the portfolio. However, it is worth nothing that a uniform allocation
is not attained since less risky countries (i.e. those with a lower clustering coefficient) provide a higher
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contribution as a risk minimizer. When volatility increases, the number of countries appearing in
the optimal solution shows a marked drop, highlighting concentration on a single country (flight to
safety). In particular, Ireland (IE), before its fall into recession in late 2008, Germany (DE) and
United Kingdom (UK) are the preferred solutions in the period 2009-2012.
It is noteworthy that the linearization procedure allows solution of the problem in a short time.
We also re-formalized the optimization problem by applying the mean semi-absolute deviation (see
Speranza (1993) and Chiodi et al. (2003)), halving the number of constraints. However, results are
equivalent to those obtained by solving the problem based on the MAD metric and the improvement
in terms of computational efficiency is not so significant in this context.
Figure 2: Minimum systemic risk portfolios for each sub-period based on the short-term multi-period
setting. In particular, problem (12-13) has been solved focusing on sub-periods of 30 days. For each




The analysis has been further extended, expanding the length of each time window to 90 and
180 days (see Figure 3). Moving towards more long-term analyses, we observe an even lower diversi-
fication. In particular, the quotes of the minimum systemic risk portfolios are mainly concentrated
on low-risk countries (UK and DE).
As shown in Table 1, this pattern is also more evident when the long-term problem is solved. The
optimal solution provides, on average, four different countries when time windows of one-year length
are considered. Finally, problem (14-15), based on the overall analysis of the evolution of risk over
the full period, leads to a full allocation in only one country (DE).
The strong presence of less risky countries in the optimal configuration is also confirmed through
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Figure 3: Minimum systemic risk allocations for each sub-period based on the short-term multi-
period setting. The size of each period has been extended to 90 and 180 days, reported on the
left-hand and the right-hand side, respectively. For each period, darker bars are associated with







Length of each sub-period (Short-Term) Length of each sub-period (Short-Term)
30 Days 90 Days 180 Days 1 Year Long-Term 30 Days 90 Days 180 Days 1 Year
CZ 5.7% 2.6% 4.7% 0.0% 0% 8.1% 1.9% 3.7% 0.0%
DE 36.9% 42.2% 40.1% 46.8% 100% 38.8% 47.2% 48.1% 50.0%
ES 11.6% 11.3% 11.1% 7.1% 0% 14.4% 15.1% 11.1% 7.1%
FR 15.2% 14.2% 24.0% 21.4% 0% 18.8% 18.9% 22.2% 21.4%
GR 0.7% 0% 0.1% 0% 0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
HR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
IE 7.5% 7.4% 2.2% 0% 0% 7.5% 7.5% 3.7% 0%
IT 2.0% 0.3% 0% 0% 0% 2.5% 0% 0% 0%
PL 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.6% 0% 0% 0%
PT 1.0% 0.4% 0% 0% 0% 0.6% 0% 0% 0%
RO 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TR 0.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UK 18.5% 21.5% 17.7% 24.6% 0% 20.0% 20.8% 18.5% 28.6%
Table 1: Average (over the sub-periods k) of the optimal exposures to the sovereign risk of countries






and the proportion τ∗i of sub-periods in which at least 30% of the total portfolio
is allocated in a country i.
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analysis of the number of periods where at least 30% of the total is allocated in a single country (see
the last four columns of Table 1). We observe that the low level and the low volatility of the German
clustering coefficient lead the agent to allocate a significant portion of the portfolio to Germany, in
approximately 40% of the sub-periods.
Therefore, we initially removed Germany and the United Kingdom from the network to test how
they affect the optimal solution (see Figure 4, left). Focusing only on a short-term view with 30
day sub-periods, we notice some main differences since 2009. Also in this case, we observe a lower
diversification in high volatile periods, but France (FR) and Czech Republic (CZ) appear as the best
players. The average weight x̄∗i of these two countries increases to 39.4% and 32.4%, respectively.
This phenomenon is even more evident when FR is removed from the network (see Figure 4, right).
In this case, the average allocation in CZ is almost 40%. The motivations for this outcome deserves
investigation, but this is outside the scope of the present study. However, some suggestions can be
carried out. Under this perspective, we point out that the financial crisis of 2007-2010 did not affect
CZ, mainly because of its stable banking sector and the small ratio of the gross domestic product
to debt, which is among the smallest in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the impact
of the economic crisis may have been limited also by the existence of the national currency that
temporarily weakened during the crisis and, consequently, did not harm exports.
As expected, when less risky countries are removed, a greater diversification is observed. On one
hand, Portugal, Italy, Poland and Turkey are characterized by greater average weights. On the other
hand, Greece, Romania and Hungary provide values of x̄∗i in line with those reported in Table 1.
5.1 Main sensitivities
In this section we report several sensitivities over the range of credible model parameters as well
as a comparison with a portfolio VaR. The aim of the analysis is to measure the consistency of the
proposed approach.
5.1.1 Correlation effects
We analyze here the effect of the introduction of pairwise correlation between each couple of countries
on the minimum systemic risk portfolio. In particular, we define link weights as the joint default
probabilities for each couple of countries. Thus, we modify formula (1) by including the effect of
default correlation (as provided in Li (2016)):
wij(t) = Pi(t)Pj(t) + ρi,j(t)
√
(1− Pi(t)) (1− Pj(t))Pi(t)Pj(t), ∀ i 6= j, (16)
where ρi,j(t) is the default correlation between CDS spreads of country i and country j at time t.
In the numerical application, we estimate the correlation matrix by considering the same time
interval considered in the optimal problem. For instance, in the case of a short-term view with 30
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Figure 4: Minimum systemic risk portfolio x(k)∗ with sub-periods of 30 days. On the left, the
problem (12-13) has been solved removing Germany and United Kingdom from the network (i.e.
the optimal portfolio is based on 11 countries). On the right, we consider 10 countries by also




day sub-periods, ρi,j(t) is computed separately in each sub-period by using 30 bivariate observations
for each couple i, j.
To provide an initial comparison with the case of independence (Figure 1), we display in Figure 5
(left) the behavior of the clustering coefficient computed using formula (2), by considering in each
time period t a network whose link weights have been obtained by (16). In this case, the correlation
coefficient ρi,j(t) has been calibrated using the whole period (i.e. ρi,j(t) = ρi,j∀t). The correlation
matrix is reported in Figure 5 (right). It is noticeable that the positive correlation leads to greater
clustering coefficients for all countries. In particular, this effect is considerable during the sovereign
debt crisis because of a significant increase of the co-movement among spreads (i.e. a greater level
of market correlation). Hence, the coefficients are affected by the higher probability of contagion
during a period of turmoil.
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out the lower default probabilities between Greece and UK and
Greece and Turkey (TR) when the correlation is considered.
Given the joint default probabilities, we solved the optimal problem testing alternative time
windows (as in Table 1). As reported in Table 2, results are in line with the case of independence.
Focusing on sub-periods of 30 days, we observe again a well-diversified partition in quiet periods (e.g.
2003-2007 ) and a higher concentration in low-risk countries (UK and DE) in turbulent periods. We
notice a greater average share than in the independence case for UK because of a lower correlation
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Figure 5: Patterns of local clustering coefficients over time (left). Coefficients have been computed
using networks whose edge weights have been calibrated via formula (16). Correlation matrix be-
tween marginal default probabilities estimated using data of the whole period (right).
with more risky countries. Lower diversification is confirmed for long-term analysis. As in the
independence case, only four countries contribute to minimizing risk when time windows of one-year
length are considered. However, it is worth pointing out that the role of Spain (ES) is replaced by
TR when the dependency is taken into account. Indeed, we observe that the TR CDS spreads are
in line with other European countries since 2011, but with a lower average correlation than other
CDSs.
5.1.2 Effect of the maximum level of tolerable risk
We test also the effect of parameter µ̄ on the results. While previous analyses have been developed
assuming that the first constraint in (13) is always satisfied, we assume now that the economic agent
selects the highest level of clustering coefficient that can be tolerated. In Figure 6, we therefore test
the effect of alternative values of µ̄ on the optimal exposures. For the sake of brevity, we focus only
on a short-term view with sub-periods of 30 days. Furthermore, to assure a consistent comparison,
µ̄ has been set, in each time window, equal to the q-quantile of the clustering coefficient distribution.
Values of q between 0.05 and 0.5 have been tested.
We notice that, when a lower average level of risk is tolerated, the procedure assures a higher
convergence to less risky countries. For instance, 12 countries have a positive share when µ̄ is equal
to the median of the clustering coefficient distribution. For µ̄ equal to the fifth percentile of the






Length of each sub-period (Short-Term) Length of each sub-period (Short-Term)
30 days 90 days 180 days 1 year Long term 30 days 90 days 180 days 1 year
CZ 4.7% 0.8% 0% 0% 0% 6.9% 0% 0% 0%
DE 32.4% 32.7% 43.0% 40.3% 100% 37.5% 37.7% 48.1% 38.5%
ES 10.5% 8.9% 7.4% 0% 0% 12.5% 11.3% 7.4% 0%
FR 12.3% 20.3% 21.7% 28.6% 0% 14.4% 22.6% 22.2% 30.8%
GR 0.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0% 0% 1.3% 0% 0% 0%
HR 0.4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.6% 0% 0% 0%
IE 6.2% 7.1% 1.7% 0% 0% 6.9% 7.5% 3.7% 0%
IT 3.7% 0.7% 3.8% 0% 0% 5.0% 1.9% 3.7% 0%
PL 0.4% 0.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PT 1.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3.1% 0% 0% 0%
RO 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TR 1.9% 1.9% 3.7% 2.6% 0% 3.1% 1.9% 7.4% 7.7%
UK 24.8% 27.3% 18.3% 28.6% 0% 27.5% 32.1% 22.2% 30.8%
Table 2: Average (over the sub-periods k) of the optimal exposures to the sovereign risk of countries






and the proportion τ∗i of sub-periods in which at least 30% of the total portfolio
is allocated in a country i. The problem has been solved considering joint default correlation in the
clustering coefficient.
Figure 6: Average optimal exposure x̄∗i for each country obtained by varying the level of µ̄. We
solve the optimal problem considering 30 day sub-periods and the networks with link weights given
by formula (16). In each scenario, the value of µ̄ has been set, in each time window, equal to the
q-quantile of the clustering coefficient distribution. Values of q (reported on the x-axis) vary from
0.5 to 0.05 with a step of 0.025.
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5.1.3 Comparison with a VaR model
We test here the effect of a different risk measure in the optimal portfolio. Thus, we re-formulate











where Qα is the α-quantile of the distribution and we define the following constraints:
∑N
i=1 xi(t) = 1, for each t = 1, . . . , T ;
xi(t) ≥ 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T .
(18)
Coherently with the systemic risk definition, we defined the VaR approach in (17) by taking
into account that the clustering coefficient is preferred to be low rather than high. Thus, VaR
minimization will not deal with the left tail of the distribution, as in the classical financial models,
but with the right tail5.
Problem (17-18) has been solved on the same data set to provide a consistent comparison with
the results obtained using a MAD risk measure. For the sake of brevity, we report only the results
derived by considering a short-term view with sub-periods of 30 days and by computing the clus-
tering coefficient on the networks with link weights given by formula (16) (i.e. linear correlation).
Differently from the MAD portfolio, the problem cannot be formalized as a linear programming one.
Hence, we experimented with very long computational times when we tried to solve this problem
with an exact algorithm. To provide a feasible solution we employed the Simulated Annealing al-
gorithm (see Černỳ (1985), Granville et al. (1994) and Kirkpatrick Jr et al. (1983)), through an R
procedure (R Development Core Team (2011)). Obviously, it could be that the selected optimal
portfolio is suboptimal. Therefore, to assure a robust result, we tested this possibility by following a
Neighborhood Search procedure logic (see Mladenović and Hansen (1997) and Speranza (1996) for
an application to portfolio optimization).
It is worth pointing out that the two problems we are comparing focus on different aspects.
On the one hand, the MAD minimization is based on a disaggregation between the deviations of
the clustering coefficient and its expected value. On the other hand, VaR minimization aims at
reducing the right tail of the weighted clustering coefficient distribution. Additionally, the VaR
model is strongly dependent on the selection of a proper confidence level. To provide a numerical
comparison, we report in Figure 7 the main results derived by assuming a confidence level of 99%. It
is noteworthy how the VaR-portfolio provides a low diversification. Optimal values are concentrated
5This approach is common, for instance, in engineering or actuarial applications where the VaR is computed using
the distribution of losses.
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Figure 7: Optimal exposures derived by solving problem (17-18). Short-term view with sub-periods
of 30 days and clustering coefficients computed on the networks with link weights given by formula
(16). VaR has been evaluated at confidence level α = 0.99. For each period, darker bars are
associated with higher values of x
(k)∗
i .
in almost all periods in less risky countries. Since this measure is less sensitive to variation in the
central part of the distribution, the procedure typically converges on the country with the lowest
clustering coefficient in the period.
5.1.4 Suitability of models: comparison between MAD and VaR models
As previously described, the optimal weights of portfolio x(k)? assess the relative relevance of coun-
tries as systemically risky agent within the overall system. Hence, a high value of the weight means
that the related country plays a relevant role in reducing systemic risk. Under this interpretation,
we develop here a suitable comparison between the optimal weights detected by the model and those
coming out from the application of CISS.
Indeed, although the two approaches are based on a different framework and pursue different pur-
poses, it is interesting to assess for each window the consistency of the optimal portfolio detected by
our model with the systemic risk conditions in the market, provided by CISS. With regard to CISS,
we collected data, made available from the European Central Bank, of the Composite Indicator of
Sovereign Stress for each country in our sample in the analyzed period.6 To do this, we focus on 30
days sub-periods and we solve problem (12-13) considering the clustering coefficient on the networks
with link weights given by formula (16) – i.e., in presence of linear correlation. Therefore, we com-
6Since these data are not available for Turkey and Romania, the comparison has been developed here without
considering these countries in the sample.
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pute the correlation between countries’ ranks based on the optimal portfolio and CISS in the same
period. In particular, we consider one-year periods and we rank countries on the basis of the average
allocation given by the model in that year, so that the top country is the one with the maximum
x
(k)?
i in the considered period. Similarly, we rank countries in increasing order based on CISS – i.e.,
the country with the smallest CISS in the period is ranked as one. Then, the correlation between
ranks is computed for each period. Hence, the higher the correlation, the higher the consistency
between the model and CISS in the treatment of countries systemic relevance.
The same procedure has been applied by considering a VaR risk measure. Both correlations are
reported in Figure 9. It is noteworthy that a significant positive correlation is observed, hence con-
firming that the model based on the MAD metric allocates a higher share of portfolio in countries
with a higher relevance in minimizing systemic risk also for CISS. We also notice that the model
based on a MAD risk measure provides a higher correlation than VaR in all time periods. Finally,
a good behavior is also observed during the sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 8: Rank correlation between CISS and optimal portfolio (based on MAD (red line) and VaR
(black line) risk measures, respectively). For CISS, countries’ ranks are computed in ascending order.
Optimal exposures are derived by solving problem (12-13). We considered a short-term view with
sub-periods of 30 days and clustering coefficients computed on the networks with link weights given
by formula (16). VaR has been evaluated at a confidence level α = 0.99. For each period, light blue
bars represent the average CISS.
From our point of view, the clustering coefficient is a tool for measuring the state of stress
of the financial system but it is not necessarily a predictor of systemic crisis – at least – when
long time periods are considered. However, we test the behavior of the model in an out-of-sample
perspective (see Tashman (2000)) considering short-term frameworks. In this regard, we divide the
whole period 2003-2017 in windows of width ` – for example, ` = 30 days. The data of the first
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window (i.e. from t = 1 to t = `) are used to build the network and to estimate the clustering
coefficients. Clustering coefficients are then used to solve the problem (12-13) in the out-of-sample
period (i.e. using data from t = `+1 to t = 2`). In this period, rank correlation between the optimal
portfolio and CISS is then computed. In this way, the time-window from t = 1 to t = ` represents
a fit period used to calibrate models parameter, while the out-of-sample window from t = ` + 1
to t = 2` is used to validate the approach testing the consistency of the results with countries’
systemic relevance provided by CISS. The process is repeated rolling the window ` steps forward
and the optimal allocation problem is solved in the new out-of-sample window using the network
built in the previous period. The same procedure has been applied using a VaR risk measure (i.e.
problem (17-18)). We display in Figure 9 the correlation coefficients with CISS of both models, by
considering also alternative window widths. It is worth pointing out that both models provide a
good behavior with a preference for model based on MAD when short-periods are considered. As
expected, when a larger width ` is considered (for instance six months or one year), models tend to
be more aligned, hence providing similar patterns and slight worse results. Finally, we notice that
VaR risk measure never performs better than MAD in these analyses.
Figure 9: Rank correlation between CISS and optimal portfolios (based on MAD (red line) and VaR
(black line) risk measures, respectively) computed under an out-of-sample perspective. For CISS,
countries’ ranks are computed in ascending order. In this case, optimal exposures are derived by
solving problem (12-13), and by using the clustering coefficients observed in the previous window
and computed on the networks with link weights given by formula (16). We considered alternative
lengths of sub-periods. VaR has been evaluated at a confidence level α = 0.99. For each period,
lightblue bars represent the average CISS.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has dealt with themes from optimization, finance, complex systems and systemic risk
management in a unified perspective. In particular, we have implemented a MAD-based portfolio
model for minimizing the exposure to systemic risk, in a sovereign framework, of the network built
by the considered countries. Two different portfolio strategies have been taken into account: a
multi-period and a one-period portfolio setting. The considered risk measure was the MAD, which
seems to be particularly suitable in our context.
According to the literature on complex systems, weighted local clustering coefficients are used
as proxies for synthesizing the systemic risk. Each country is connected with the others, hence
generating a complete network. The network is also weighted, and edge weights are assumed to be
directly related to the default probability of the connected countries, so that a high mutual influence
should be intended in a negative sense.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on 13 European countries and, default probabilities
are calibrated from their CDS quotes. Marked differences characterize long-term and short-term
strategies. In general, results reflect the financial and economic reality of the European countries in
times of crisis, highlighting also the disparities among members of the European Union.
Interpretation of the quotes of the optimal portfolio offers an indirect explanation of the use of an
undirected network. Indeed, to detect if a country acts as either a risk spreader or a risk absorber is
a matter that concerns the risk-propagation process on the network, that is how an external shock is
conceptualized and risk spreads in an interconnected system. Even if this is a crucial task, it is out
of the scope of the present paper. We aim here to provide a way to measure the relative relevance
of the countries as systemically risky agents within the overall system. According to our definition,
such a procedure can rank the considered countries in terms of their role in minimizing systemic risk.
The rank provides a unified view of the countries and of their interconnections, without a specific
focus on shock definition and propagation patterns.
In this perspective, our interest is only on the strength of connections among the different countries,
under the point of view of joint default probabilities. In so doing, we consider the mutual influence
between two countries as a key ingredient of the introduced definition of systemic risk, without
paying attention to the directionality, which is unnecessary in our framework.
The analysis of shock definition and propagation is of particular interest in this field, and we leave
such a relevant theme for further research.
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V. Černỳ. Thermodynamical approach to the traveling salesman problem: An efficient simulation
algorithm. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 45(1):41–51, 1985.
L. Chiodi, R. Mansini, and M. G. Speranza. Semi-Absolute Deviation Rule for Mutual Funds
Portfolio Selection. Annals of Operations Research, 124(1):245–265, 2003.
A. Clauset. Finding local community structure in networks. Physical Review E, 72(2):026132, 2005.
G.P. Clemente and R. Grassi. Directed clustering in weighted networks: a new perspective. Chaos,
Solitons & Fractals, 107:26–38, 2018.
S. R Das and P. Hanouna. Implied recovery. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(11):
1837–1857, 2009.
V. DeMiguel, L. Garlappi, F.J. Nogales, and R. Uppal. A Generalized Approach to Portfolio Opti-
mization: Improving Performance By Constraining Portfolio Norms. Management Science, 55(5):
798–812, 2009.
26
A. Dı́az, J. Groba, and P. Serrano. What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the
CDS market. Journal of International Money and Finance, 37:529–563, 2013.
J. Dovern and B. Van Roye. International transmission and business-cycle effects of financial stress.
Journal of Financial Stability, 13:1–17, 2014.
T. Duprey, B. Klaus, and T. Peltonen. Dating systemic financial stress episodes in the EU countries.
Journal of Financial Stability, 32:30–56, 2017.
E. Estrada. The Structure of Complex Networks: Theory and Applications. Oxford University Press,
2012.
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